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Commentaries
Chief Justice Warren and 1984
By BERNARD SCHWARTZ*
When George Orwell published his chilling projection of the fu-
ture in 1984, Earl Warren was in the middle of his second term as Gov-
ernor of California. A vigorous, hard-working political leader,
Governor Warren projected an unexciting image of competence. John
Gunther, in his widely-read Inside U.S.A., described Warren as a man
endowed with "decency, stability, sincerity, and [a] lack of genuine in-
tellectual distinction." Gunther predicted that Warren would "never
set the world on fire or even make it smoke."'
Despite his apparent blandness as governor, Earl Warren as Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court left a deep impression on
the law of American criminal procedure. This Commentary recounts
the significant criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court. Such
a review is especially appropriate because in 1984, the year chosen by
Orwell for his chilling vision of the future, Americans do not live in an
Orwellian society. This Commentary concludes that Chief Justice
Warren, as much as any one person could, ensured that Orwell's pre-
diction would remain only fiction and not foreshadow modern society.
It Was the Warren Court
As a prelude, a word should be said about the extent to which
Chief Justice Warren was personally responsible for what was achieved
during his tenure. An era of the Supreme Court customarily is desig-
nated by the name of its Chief Justice. During Warren's tenure this
designation was more than a mere formality. While headed by Warren,
the Supreme Court bore the mark of its Chief Justice as unmistakably
as the earlier Courts of Marshall and Taney had reflected the unique
leadership of those two men.
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Some students of the high Court dispute Warren's leadership.
They claim that, although Warren was the titular head of the Court,
the actual leadership was furnished by other Justices. Some assert that
the proper title of the high bench while Warren sat in its center chair
was the Brennan Court.2 A biographer of Justice Black, however, has
contended that it was the Alabaman who guided the judicial revolution
of the Warren years. 3 Justice Black also believed that he had led the
judicial revolution that rewrote so much of the corpus of our constitu-
tional law. As Black saw it, the Court under Warren simply gave its
stamp of approval to the constitutional principles that he had been ad-
vocating for so many years.4
Other Justices who served with Chief Justice Warren, however,
recognized his leadership role. Justice Douglas, philosophically closest
to Justice Black, ranked Warren with John Marshall and Charles Evan
Hughes as "our three greatest Chief Justices." 5 Another member of the
Warren Court told me that the Chief Justice was personally responsible
for the key decisions during his tenure. The Justices who sat with him
acknowledge that Chief Justice Warren was not an intellectual like Jus-
tice Frankfurter, but then, noted Justice Potter Stewart, "he never pre-
tended to be one."'6 More important, remarked Stewart, Warren
possessed "instinctive qualities of leadership."' 7 When Stewart was
asked whether Justice Black was the intellectual leader of the Court, he
replied, "If Black was the intellectual leader, Warren was the leader
leader."8
Warren brought more effective leadership to the Chief Justiceship
than there had been in years. The most important work of the
Supreme Court occurs behind the scenes, particularly at the confer-
ences where the Justices discuss and vote on cases. An effective Chief
Justice, exercising his prerogative to call and discuss cases before the
other Justices speak, controls the conference discussion. Those who
2. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chif" Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L.
Rnv. 922, 923 (1983).
3. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977).
4. Justice Black apparently resented the acclaim that the Chief Justice received as
leader of the Warren Court. When Warren retired as Chief Justice, the Justices prepared
the traditional letter of farewell. The draft letter read: "For us it is a source of pride that we
have had the opportunity to be members of the Warren Court." Black changed this to "the
Court over which you have presided." B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND
HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 630 (1983).
5. W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975 240 (1980).





served with him marveled at Chief Justice Warren's ability to lead the
conference. "It is incredible," Justice Brennan once said, "how effi-
ciently the Chief would conduct the conferences, leading the discussion
of every case on the agenda, with a knowledge of each case at his
fingertips." 9
The conference notes of Justices on the Warren Court demonstrate
that the Chief Justice was a remarkably effective leader of the Court.
Some believe the conference notes indicate that Warren was "even
more of a guiding force in the landmark opinions of his court than had
been previously believed. From the moment they were first discussed,
Warren helped steer cases simply by the way he framed the issues."'1
In almost all the important cases, the Chief Justice led the discussion
toward the decision he favored.'l During his tenure, the high bench
was emphatically the Warren Court and, without arrogance, he, as well
as the country, knew it. Thus, when we consider the work of the War-
ren Court, we are considering a constitutional corpus that was a direct
product of the Chief Justice's leadership.
Big Brother Is Watching You
What readers find most abhorrent about the future projected by
Orwell is the mutation of government into the all-seeing Big Brother,
against whom no rights of individual privacy exist. 1984 depicts a soci-
ety in which the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
government search and seizure are inconceivable.
When Orwell described the horrors of an authoritarian society of
the future, he used as his most frightening metaphor the "telescreen," a
device permitting total surveillance over the individual. Like the mod-
em television, the telescreen enabled a viewer to see and hear television
transmissions. The telescreen differed, however, in one sinister respect:
it enabled government security personnel to peer into a room at any
time without alerting the room's occupants.12 The placement of a teles-
creen in every enclosed area and on every street comer made it possible
for the government to maintain complete surveillance over the individ-
ual: "You had to live--did live, from habit that became instinct-in the
assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
9. Whitman, For 16 Years, Warren Saw the Constitution as Protector of Rights and
Equality, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 42, col. 1.
10. Washington Post, June 15, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
11. See, e.g., B. SCHWARTZ supra note 4, at 86, 293, 412.
12. G. ORWELL, 1984, at 3-4 (1949).
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darkness, every movement scrutinized."' 13 Thus, not only the expecta-
tion of privacy, but also its very existence was eliminated in Orwell's
future world.
American jurisprudence most closely approached the Orwellian
nightmare when it condoned intrusive, secret surveillance in Smayda n,
United States,14 a 1965 case challenging clandestine police surveillance
of public lavatories to apprehend homosexuals. In Smayda, the sur-
veillance extended to the enclosed toilet stalls. Through peepholes cut
in the ceiling above each stall and disguised as air vents, the police
photographed homosexual acts committed by the defendants. 15 The
court of appeals held that the surveillance did not constitute an unrea-
sonable search and that the evidence obtained was constitutionally ad-
missible against the defendants.' 6 "We are made as uncomfortable as
the next man," conceded the court, "by the thought that our own legiti-
mate activities in such a place may be spied upon by the police." 17
Nevertheless, the court concluded that under the circumstances the
public interest in law enforcement overrode the individual's right to
privacy.' 8
The decision in Smayda is troublesome. The invasion of privacy
condoned by the court is similar, in kind if not degree, to the vision of
the future so strikingly described by Orwell: "For a moment he was
tempted to take [the letter] into one of the water closets and read it at
once. But that would be shocking folly as he well knew. There was no
place where you could be more certain that the telescreens were
watched continuously." ' 9
This troubling decision was rooted in the pre-Warren Supreme
Court jurisprudence, based on the seminal case of Olmstead v. United
States.20 Under the Olmstead test, eavesdropping and surveillance did
not violate the fourth amendment in the absence of physical trespass. 2'
For example, in Goldman v. United States,22 federal agents placed a
detectaphone on a wall, enabling them to hear conversations in an ad-
joining office. The Court held that there was no fourth amendment
13. Id. This passage was quoted in United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 317 (2d Cir.
1951), af'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
14. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
15. d at 252-53.
16. Id at 253-54.
17. Id at 257.
18. Id at 254.
19. G. ORWELL, supra note 12, at 89.
20. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21. Id at 467.
22. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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violation because a connection to a wall not on the property of the
defendant did not constitute a trespass. 23 The Olmstead trespass the-
ory seemed especially applicable in Smayda because the police surveil-
lance occurred in a public place. Although a man's home may be his
castle, its privacy beyond invasion by either inquisitive or officious peo-
ple, even the strongest proponent of privacy on the pre-Warren Court,
Justice Douglas, recognized that "[a] man loses that privacy of course
when he goes upon the streets or enters public places." 24
Even before the Warren Court altered the prevailing current of
jurisprudence, the Chief Justice urged overruling the Olmsteadrule au-
thorizing surveillance in the absence of physical trespass. At the con-
ference on Silverman v. United States,25 Warren for the first time
invited his confreres to overrule Olmstead. Receiving the support of
only three other Justices, the Chief Justice ultimately agreed to reverse
on the ground that a trespass had been committed by police use of a
spike microphone and to forego dissent on the Olmstead issue.26
In Katz v. United States,27 a key Warren Court decision, the Chief
Justice was more successful in persuading the Justices effectively to
overrule the Olmstead rationale. Katz was convicted of interstate
transmission of wagering information by telephone. FBI agents had
attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone
booth from which he had placed his calls. Because there had been no
physical trespass into the area occupied by Katz, the court of appeals,
relying on Olmstead, rejected the contention that the eavesdropping vi-
olated the fourth amendment.28
Led by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court repudiated the Olm-
steadtrespass test and reversed the lower court. The Court held in Katz
that the fourth amendment protected the privacy of a person using a
phone booth.29 The bugging of the phone booth was a search governed
by the amendment, even without any "technical trespass. ' 30 Thus, the
reach of the constitutional protection could no longer "turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion."' 3' Instead, the key ques-
23. Id at 135.
24. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
25. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
26. Id. at 509-12. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 386-87.
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
29. 389 U.S. at 353.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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tion became whether the individual was entitled to a "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" in the factual circumstances presented. 32 An
individual using a phone booth "is surely entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted. ' 33 The booth may be open to the
public, but when in use "it is a temporarily private place whose mo-
mentary occupants' expectations are recognized as reasonable. '34
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion noted that "today's deci-
sion must be recognized as overruling Olmstead"35 In a letter to Jus-
tice Stewart, author of Katz, the Chief Justice wrote, "I believe that it
will be a milestone decision." 36 Under Katz, as a more recent federal
case explained, "Once it has been determined that the circumstances
justify an expectation of privacy which is subjectively and objectively
reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires that the detached restraint
of a neutral official be interposed between the individual and the gov-
ernmental intrusion."37
The Katz decision effectively removed the jurisprudential founda-
tion upon which the Smayda case rested. In Kroehler v. Scott,38
although the facts were nearly identical to those in Smayda,39 the court
held that police reliance on Smayda was misplaced because the
Supreme Court decision in Katz required a different result.40 The
Court, applying the Katz expectation of privacy test, was persuaded
that plaintiffs harbored expectations of privacy that were subjectively
and objectively reasonable, and thus were entitled to fourth amend-
ment protections.4' Because the police failed to secure a warrant, the
court concluded that the search was unreasonable per se under Katz.4 2
From Olmstead to Silverman to Katz, there was a transformation
in Supreme Court jurisprudence that was largely triggered by Chief
Justice Warren. The Chief Justice had indicated his antipathy toward
the Olmstead test in Silverman, and in Katz was ultimately able to se-
cure its rejection by the Court. The expectation of privacy test substi-
tuted by the Warren Court for the Olmstead doctrine is the very
32. Id. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 362.
36. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 718.
37. Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
38. 391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
39. Id at 1115-16.
40. Id. at 1116-17.
41. Id. at 1117.
42. Id See also People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d. 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1973); People v. Dezek, 107 Mich. App. 78, 308 N.W.2d 652 (1981).
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antithesis of the governmental intrusion in 1984. Against Big Brother,
the very notion of an "expectation of privacy" would have been
incomprehensible.
Criminal Procedure
Since the time of Magna Carta, no common-law country has legiti-
mated the power of arbitrary arrest and detention.4 3 In those countries
physical restraint is prima facie illegal and can be justified only when
an accused prisoner awaits trial or when a duly-convicted prisoner is
serving a sentence.44 Arrest or imprisonment without such justification
is normally contrary to law and will be nullified in a habeas corpus
proceeding.45
These concepts would be utterly meaningless to the denizen of the
Orwellian society, a world in which individual privacy and individual
integrity had become nonexistent. "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons," guaranteed by the fourth amendment, would be as
inoperative as the other rights protected by the amendment. Society
had completely gotten the better of individuality. Big Brother was
vested with a power to arrest and punish that was not limited to speci-
fied violations of known laws. Orwell described the protagonist's keep-
ing a diary as "not illegal (nothing was illegal, since there were no
longer any laws), but if detected it was reasonably certain that it would
be punished by death, or at least by twenty-five years in a forced-labor
camp."'46 Like so much else that we take for granted, the principle of
nullapoena sine lege, no punishment without law, had become incon-
ceivable in the society of 1984.
Advances In The Protection Of Individual Rights Under The Warren Court
The concept of criminal procedure as a safeguard of individual
rights was nonexistent in the Orwellian community. "In the vast ma-
jority of cases there was no trial, no report of the arrest. People simply
disappeared, always during the night. Your name was removed from
the registers, every record of everything you had ever done was wiped
43. 1 H. HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 234 (5th ed. 1846).
44. A. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 208 (9th ed. 1939).
45. Samuel Johnson once commented, "The habeas corpus is the single advantage our
government has over that of other countries." BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, entry
for September, 1769. See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969) (habeas corpus
is the fundamental instrument safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and law-
less action).
46. G. ORWELL, supra note 12, at 9.
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out . . . You were abolished, annihilated: vaporized was the usual
word." 47  Under the Chief Justice's leadership, the Warren Court
veered from the Orwellian specter in a trio of decisions protecting
criminals from abuse by our system: Gideon v. Wainwright,48 Miranda v.
A4rizona,49 and Mapp v. Ohio.50
Gideon v. Wainwright, which held that an accused is entitled to
independent counsel,51 is a key decision in this respect. The Court con-
cluded that the criminal accused's right to counsel was so fundamental
as to be included in the due process guaranty. Gideon was convicted of
a felony after the trial judge had denied his request for the assistance of
a court-appointed lawyer. Following the Chief Justice's lead, the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction. "[R]eason and reflection," de-
clared the Court, "requires us to recognize that in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. '52
The Gideon decision gave force to the express constitutional guar-
antee of the right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. But, as
Anthony Lewis noted, "The constitution does not answer the critical
question: When does the right to counsel begin?" 53
The Warren Court addressed this question in Miranda v. Ari-
zona.54 Miranda had been convicted in state court of kidnapping and
rape. Following his arrest, he was taken to an interrogation room and
questioned without being advised that he had a right to have an attor-
ney present. After two hours of questioning, the police secured a con-
fession that was admitted into evidence over Miranda's objection. The
state's highest court affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion authored by the
Chief Justice, the Court held that statements made by an individual
during custodial interrogation are not admissible in court unless the
police gave full effect to the defendant's rights to remain silent and to
have his attorney present.55 If he wishes to have counsel present during
47. G. ORWELL, supra note 12, at 20.
48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
52. Id at 344.
53. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 588.
54. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
55. Id at 478-79.
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the questioning, interrogation must be suspended until his attorney is
present.
The majority agreed with the Chief Justice that custodial interro-
gation exacted a heavy toll on individual liberty and traded on the
weaknesses of individuals.5 6 Chief Justice Warren had no doubt that
the Miranda rights came into play when the individual was taken into
custody and interrogated.57 "I didn't know," he commented during the
argument before the Court, "that we could arrest people in this country
for investigation. Wouldn't you say it was accusatory when a man was
locked in jail?"5 s
The Miranda decision drastically altered American criminal law.
Under the rule of Miranda, the police must advise the defendant that
he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him, and that he has a right to have a lawyer present, regardless
of his ability to pay for one. In effect, the Warren Court decided that
an accused who requests the assistance of counsel should have it at any
time after he is taken into custody.
The Miranda decision exemplified Warren's concern for the pro-
tection of the rights of criminal defendants. Every so often in criminal
cases, when counsel defending convictions would cite legal precedents,
Warren would bend over the bench and ask, "Yes, yes-but were you
fair?" 59 The fairness that concerned the Chief Justice was no jurispru-
dential abstraction. It related to methods of arrest, questioning of sus-
pects, and police conduct, matters Chief Justice Warren understood
intimately through his experience as a district attorney. The Miranda
decision embodied the Warren fairness approach.
The Warren Court's concern for protecting the defendant's rights
and for curbing illegal or oppressive police conduct was also manifest
in Mapp v. Ohio,60 in which the Court adopted the rule barring the
admission of illegally seized evidence in state criminal cases. Prior to
Mapp, the Supreme Court had not interpreted the United States Con-
stitution to require application of the exclusionary rule in state criminal
cases. The Warren Court held in Mapp that the exclusionary rule was a
part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, and binding on the
states.6' Mapp's state court conviction was reversed because illegally
56. Id at 455.
57. Id. at 444.
58. 34 U.S.L.W. 3298-99 (1966).
59. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 628.
60. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
61. Id at 657.
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seized evidence had been admitted at the trial.62 This holding, the
Court remarked, closed "the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness" 63 in violation of the constitu-
tional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. In effect,
the Court held that even the rights of a criminal defendant could pre-
vail against the interests of the police in apprehending criminals. Such
a balancing of rights could not exist in the Orwellian world in which
the power of the state was preeminent and the right of the individual
nonexistent.
In its criminal law decisions, the Warren Court greatly extended
the reach of the Bill of Rights, making virtually all of its guarantees
binding upon the states as well as the federal government. This result
was obtained without formally abandoning the selective incorporation
approach previously endorsed by the Supreme Court.64 In a famous
pre-Warren dissent from that view, Justice Black had argued that the
fourteenth amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights in its due
process clause. 65 Although Justice Black lost the total incorporation
battle, during Warren's tenure he nearly won the war. Led by the
Chief Justice, the Warren Court held nearly all of the Bill of Rights
guarantees to be fundamental and hence absorbed by due process.
In this regard, Mapp v. Ohio and Gideon v. Wainwright were key
decisions. In those cases the Court characterized as fundamental, and
therefore within the due process clause, the right against the use of ille-
gally secured evidence and the right to counsel. 66 Speaking broadly of
the need to protect individual rights, these cases signaled a trend to
require that the states honor more of the Bill of Rights guarantees of
individual rights. In the decade that followed, the Warren Court also
held to be fundamental and hence binding upon the states all but two 67
guarantees of individual rights contained in the Bill of Rights. While
such rights prevail, the forbidding society foreseen by Orwell will re-
main fictional.
62. See id. at 643-60.
63. Id. at 654-55.
64. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK § 7.2 (2d ed. 1979).
65. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
66. See supra notes 51-52, 60-63 & accompanying text.
67. Cases holding a right fundamental and binding on the states include Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (right against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial in criminal cases); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront
one's accusers); and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right not to incriminate oneself).
The right to indictment by a grand jury and the right to an attorney in civil cases are not
binding on the states.
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Caveat: Technological Development and Social Change
As the prior portions of this Commentary have shown, Chief Jus-
tice Warren was primarily responsible for a jurisprudence that would
not countenance the kind of society envisaged in 1984. Indeed, in
purely legal terms, the Warren Court made it difficult for a society even
remotely like that described by Orwell to become a reality. A discus-
sion of 1984 in legal terms alone, however, does not fully address the
potential for government encroachment into everyday life manifest in
Orwell's projection of the future.
A troublesome aspect of 1984 was its implication that Big Brother
is a stage in the evolving role of government. Belief in the inevitability
of this result may be reinforced by the high profile that government
exhibits in modem society. When the Federal Constitution and the Bill
of Rights were written, however, government left the individual largely
unrestrained, arbitrating between individuals only at extreme limits of
conduct. Yet in the century and a half that followed, government's role
gradually shifted to promotion of the community welfare, even at the
cost of individual property rights. By the time Earl Warren became
Chief Justice, the welfare state had become an established fact.
As technology advances, the problem shifts from the exertion of
governmental authority over property rights to the potential for gov-
ernmental intrusion on individual privacy rights. In the words of Jus-
tice Douglas, "[t]he central problem of the age is the scientific
revolution and all the wonders and the damage it brings. ' 68 The
machine, which Orwell once called "the genie that man has thought-
lessly let out of its bottle and cannot put back again,"'69 has allowed
new concentrations of power, particularly in government, which utterly
dwarf the individual and threaten individuality as never before.
"Where in this tightly knit regime," asked Justice Douglas, "is man to
find liberty?" ' 70 Perhaps Chief Justice Warren and the members of his
Court were only being Canute-like in interposing the Bill of Rights in
the face of the ever-increasing governmental ability to violate individ-
ual rights that characterizes our time.
On the vital subject of privacy and its place in the society of the
future, Justice Douglas remarked, "We are rapidly entering the age of
no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where
68. THE GREAT RIGHTS 148 (A. Cahn ed. 1963).
69. 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 75
(1968).
70. THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 68, at 148.
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there are no secrets from government. The aggressive breaches of pri-
vacy by the Government increase by geometric proportions." 7'
Justice Brandeis, one of the fathers of the legal right of privacy,
observed a similar development in his noted dissent in Olmstead v.
United States.72 When the fourth amendment was written, declared
Brandeis, force and violence were the essential means by which privacy
could be invaded. It was against such relatively simple evils that the
constitutional guaranty was directed. With time, Brandeis noted, sub-
tler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the government. "Discovery and invention have made it
possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretch-
ing upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
the closet."'73
The development of modem methods of electronic eavesdropping
gives credence to Brandeis' observations. In 1928, when Olmsteadwas
decided, the method used to intercept telephone conversations was rel-
atively crude. The wiretapper had to splice a wire from earphones into
the telephone circuit or insert magneto wires into the telephone box,
then wait for calls to be made, and furiously scribble notes while the
parties talked.74 Today, the wiretapper has far more sophisticated
methods of making direct wire connections75 and is even capable of
intercepting phone conversations without physical connections to the
telephone or its line and wires.76 Once intercepted, the conversations
may be amplified and recorded by voice-activated recording devices
that permit the equipment to be left unattended.77 In addition, num-
bers called from the tapped phone may be recorded.
But it is in the area of non-wiretap electronic eavesdropping that
the greatest scientific advances have occurred. The impact of these ad-
vances has been summarized by Justice Brennan:
Electronic eavesdropping by means of concealed microphones and
recording devices of various kinds has become as large a problem as
wiretapping, and is pervasively employed by private detectives, po-
lice, labor spies, employers and others for a variety of purposes; some
downright disreputable .... These devices go far beyond simple
71. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
73. Id at 473.
74. See West, The Wire-tapping Problem, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 197 (1952).
75. See S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ, & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 312-18 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as S. DASH].
76. See Ognibene, Guarding Against High-Tech Espionage, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1983,
at A23, col. 3.
77. S. DASH, supra note 75, at 323-24.
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'bugging,' and permit a degree of invasion of privacy that can only be
described as frightening. 78
The potential for invasion is greatly expanded by recent develop-
ments in electronic surveillance 79 such as parabolic microphones,
which can pick up conversations at considerable distances;80 ultra-min-
iature wireless microphones no larger than a pencil eraser; recorders so
small they can be built into cigarette lighters;8' and microwave-beam
devices with a range of 1,000 feet or more, which can penetrate walls
and other obstacles.8 2
In his Olmsteaddissent, Justice Brandeis, with "unerring moral in-
sight," 83 foresaw the technological revolution that so transformed the
field of communications and magnified the potential for electronic
eavesdropping:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some-
day be developed by which the Government, without removing pa-
pers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which
it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home.84
The technological changes wrought by scientific progress have out-
stripped the law and legal commentary. The Warren Court's protective
jurisprudence may become completely outmoded by the seven-league
strides being made in long-distance eavesdropping techniques.
To be secure against police officers' breaking and entering to search
for physical objects is worth very little if there is no security against
the officers' using secret recording devices to purloin words spoken in
confidence within the four walls of home or office. . . .If electronic
surveillance by government becomes sufficiently widespread, and
there is little in prospect for checking it, the hazard that as a people
we may become hagridden and furtive is not fantasy. 85
One may question how much of the concept of privacy itself will re-
main if, through the advances in applied science,8 6 the area of privacy
remaining physically immune from official scrutiny were to all but
disappear.
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MINN. L. REv. 873, 888 (1960).
80. Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 468 n.16 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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If society moves toward the Orwellian State, the decisions of the
Supreme Court alone will not be enough to stop the trend. On the
subject of privacy, for example, technological developments may by-
pass the restrictions laid down by the Warren Court. Justice Douglas
warned:
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are
being recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear
that his most secret thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the
Government; when the most confidential and intimate conversations
are always open to eager, prying ears .... If a man's privacy can be
invaded at will, who can say he is free? If his every word is taken
down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can
say he enjoys freedom of speech? If his every association is known
and recorded, if the conversations with his associates are purloined,
who can say he enjoys freedom of association? When such condi-
tions obtain, our citizens will be afraid to utter any but the safest and
most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but the most
acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it will
have vanished.87
Will the decisions of any Court, even the Warren Court, be
enough to preserve the individual from such a society? Certainly, it is
true, as an English writer recently noted, that "[i]n America, the
Supreme Court is supreme. In no other democratic country do nine
judges, none of them elected, tell the president and the legislature what
each may or may not do."8 8 Even so, we should not overmagnify the
judicial role in maintaining the system under which we live. As Chief
Justice John Marshall stated, "The people made the constitution, and
the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only
by their will."' 89 Responsibility for the kind of society in which we live
rests ultimately not with the judges, but with the people.
Courts must not be the only instruments of government that we
rely upon to preserve our rights against intrusions by the state. If they
are, they will be largely inadequate for the purpose. Civil liberties can
at best draw only limited strength from judicial guarantees. The
Supreme Court alone cannot be expected to protect us from our own
excesses. It is no idle speculation to inquire as to which comes first,
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights or a free and tolerant soci-
ety. Must we, as Justice Jackson inquired, first maintain a system of
free government to assure a free and independent judiciary, or can we
rely upon an aggressive, activist judiciary to guarantee free govern-
87. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353-54 (1967).
88. THE ECONOMIST, July 2, 1983, at 16.
89. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 389 (1821).
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ment?90 Americans not infrequently forget the answer to this question.
Without a doubt, the Court is of basic importance, particularly in
molding public opinion to accept fully the implications of the rule of
law. The law enunciated by it may have a definite educative as well as
a normative effect. But it is the attitude of the society and of its organ-
ized political forces, rather than of its purely legal machinery alone,
that is the controlling force in the character of free institutions.
Not long before his death, Chief Justice Warren commented on
the results of a poll indicating public reaction to the Bill of Rights 180
years after its adoption. A majority of those polled favored restricting
first amendment rights as well as other constitutional rights. Warren
termed the poll results "disturbing," for they showed how large a seg-
ment of the population "believed that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights were outdated, and not essential to our way of life."91 In the
perspective of this Commentary, the poll may reveal at least as much
about the future society as does the jurisprudence of the Warren Court.
It was with profound insight that one of the greatest of modem
jurists, Judge Learned Hand, declared,
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes, be-
lieve me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save
it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save
it.92
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